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Summary
This report highlights key recommendations set out in the report of the 9/11
Commission organized by the following major thematic areas: (1) Focus of U.S.
International Anti-Terrorism Policy; (2) Institutional Steps to Protect Against and
Prepare for Terrorist Attacks; (3) Intelligence Issues; and (4) Congress and Oversight
Issues.  A bulleted summary is made, under each of these major thematic headings,
of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the
Bremer Commission, the Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees, and the Hart-Rudman Commission.
What is provided here is a structured road map to the most important
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, to those recommendations of the three
other Commissions, and to those of the Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees that are directly related to the recommendations made by
the 9/11 Commission set out within each the stipulated four thematic areas.  Links
are also provided to the texts of the original reports prepared by these entities.  This
will facilitate access to the detailed commentaries of each of these entities, providing
direct access to the rationales for each of the respective recommendations.
Background details on the formation and mandates of the Commissions reviewed are
set out in Appendix 1 of this report, as are the links to the pertinent websites where
the full texts of the individual reports may be found.
This report will not be updated.
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1 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the 9/11
Commission was established by Title VI of P.L. 107-306, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., November
27, 2002.  It made its report public on July 22, 2004.  Its charter (Sec. 602 of P.L 107-306)
called for it , among other things, to: examine and report on the facts and causes relating to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, evaluate and report on the
evidence developed by all relevant governmental agencies regarding the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attacks; to build upon the investigations of other entities, and
avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Joint Inquiry of the Select Intelligence Committees of the House
and Senate, and other executive branch, congressional or independent commission
investigations into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, other terrorist attacks, and
terrorism generally; to make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances
surrounding the attacks, and the extent of the United States’ preparedness for, and the
immediate response to, the attacks; and to investigate and report to the President and
Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that
can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.
Anti-Terrorism: Key Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission and Recent Major
Commissions and Inquiries
Introduction
This report highlights key recommendations set out in the report of the 9/11
Commission organized by the following major thematic areas: (1) Focus of U.S.
International Anti-Terrorism Policy; (2) Institutional Steps to Protect Against and
Prepare for Terrorist Attacks; (3) Intelligence Issues; (4) Congress and Oversight
Issues.  Key recommendations made by other major commissions sponsored by the
United States Government since 1999, and those of the Joint Inquiry by the House
and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, are also set out within each of the
above four thematic areas.  A bulleted summary is made, under each of these major
headings, of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, followed by bulleted
summaries of key recommendations made by the  Gilmore Commission, the Bremer
Commission, the Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, and
the Hart-Rudman Commission. What is provided here is a structured road map to the
most important recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and to those
recommendations of the three other Commissions, and to those of the Joint Inquiry
of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees that are directly related to those
made by the 9/11 Commission.1  Background details on the origins and mandates of
the Commissions whose recommendations are discussed  are set out in Appendix 1
of this report, as are links to the pertinent websites where the full texts of the reports
of these entities may be found. 
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Focus of United States International 
Anti-Terrorism Policy
Key 9/11 Commission Recommendations
! The U.S. government must attack terrorists and their organizations
by identifying and prioritizing actual or potential sanctuaries for
terrorists, and have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists
insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. The
U.S. should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that
can help in this regard.
! The United States should be willing to make the difficult long-term
commitment to the future of Pakistan. Sustaining the current scale
of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan’s
government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive
effort that extends from military aid to support for better education,
so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult
choices of their own.
! The United States and the international community should make a
long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order
to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life
of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a
sanctuary for international crime and terrorism. The United States
and the international community should help the Afghan government
extend its authority over the country, with a strategy and nation-by-
nation commitments to achieve their objectives.
! The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted,
openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they
can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are
prepared to publicly defend — a relationship about more than oil. It
should include a shared commitment to political and economic
reform, as Saudis make common cause with the outside world. It
should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural
respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists
who foment hatred.
! We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world,
committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be
generous and caring to our neighbors. America and Muslim friends
can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity. Where
Muslin governments, even those who are friends, do not respect
these principles, the United States must stand for a better future.
! Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad
vigorously. America does stand up for its values. The United States
defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals
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in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If the United
States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world,
the extremists will gladly do the job for us.
! The U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in
generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund.
Funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and
secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly
investing their own money in public education.
! A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include
economic policies that encourage development, more open societies,
and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families
and to enhance prospects for their children’s future.
! The U.S. should counter the continued growth of Islamist terrorism
by engaging other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition
strategy against Islamist terrorism. There are several multilateral
institutions in which such issues should be addressed.  But the most
important policies should be discussed and coordinated in a flexible
contact group of leading coalition governments.
! The United States should engage its friends to develop a common
coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of
captured terrorists. New principles might draw upon Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict.
! The U.S. should make a maximum effort to strengthen counter-
proliferation efforts against weapons of mass destruction by
expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Cooperative
Threat Reduction program.
! The U.S. should engage in vigorous efforts to track terrorist
financing.  This should be a central part of U.S. counterterrorism
efforts.
Key Gilmore Commission Recommendations
! The President should develop a national strategy for combating
terrorism.
! The United States should negotiate more comprehensive treaties and
agreements for combating terrorism with Canada and Mexico.
Key Bremer Commission Recommendations
! The President should not make further concessions toward Iran and
should keep Iran on the list of state sponsors of terrorism until
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Tehran demonstrates it has stopped supporting terrorism and
cooperates fully in the Khobar Towers investigation. 
! The President should actively seek support from U.S. allies to
compel Iran to cooperate in the Khobar Towers bombing
investigation.
! The President should make clear to Syria that it will remain on the
list of state sponsors of terrorism until it shuts down training camps
and other facilities in Syria and the Bekaa Valley and prohibits the
resupply of terrorist groups through Syrian-controlled territory.
! The Secretary of State should designate Afghanistan as a sponsor of
terrorism and impose all the sanctions that apply to state sponsor.
! The President should make more effective use of authority to
designate foreign governments as “Not Cooperating Fully” with U.S.
counterterrorism efforts to deter all state support for terrorism.
Specifically, the President should direct the Secretary of State to:
Consider Greece and Pakistan, among others, as candidates for this
designation. 
! Review the current list of state sponsors and recommend that certain
states be moved to the “Not Cooperating Fully” designation after
they have undertaken specified measures to cease sponsorship of
terrorism.
! Increase publicity of the activities of state sponsors and countries
designated as “Not Cooperating Fully” through special reports,
making extensive use of the Internet.
! The Secretary of State should ensure the list of  Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTO) designations is credible and frequently
updated.
! The Secretary of State, in concert with other departments and
agencies, should take the lead in developing an international
convention aimed at harmonizing national laws, sharing information,
providing early warning, and establishing accepted procedures for
conducting international investigations of cyber crime.
Key Recommendations of the Joint Inquiry of House and
Senate Intelligence Committees
! The National Security Council, in conjunction with the Director of
National Intelligence, and in consultation with the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense, should prepare, for the President’s approval,
a U.S. government-wide strategy for combating terrorism, both at
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home and abroad, including the growing terrorism threat posed by
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated
technologies. This strategy should identify and fully engage those
foreign policy, economic, military, intelligence, and law enforcement
elements that are critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in
the war against terrorism. As part of that effort, the Director of
National Intelligence shall develop the Intelligence Community
component of the strategy, identifying specific programs and budgets
an including plans to address the threats posed by Osama Bin nssg
Laden and al Qa’ida, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other significant
terrorist groups. Consistent with applicable law, the strategy should
effectively employ and integrate all capabilities available to the
Intelligence Community against those threats and should encompass
specific efforts to:
 — develop human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and
networks both overseas and within the United States; fully utilize
existing and future technologies to better exploit terrorist
communications; to improve and expand the use of data mining and
other cutting edge analytical tools; and to develop a multi-level
security capability to facilitate the timely and complete sharing of
relevant intelligence information both within the Intelligence
Community and with other appropriate federal, state, and local
authorities;
 — maximize the effective use of covert action in counterterrorist
efforts;
 — develop programs to deal with financial support for international
terrorism;
 — facilitate the ability of CIA paramilitary units and military special
operations forces to conduct joint operations against terrorist targets.
! The State Department, in consultation with the Department of
Justice, should review and report to the President and the Congress
by June 30, 2003 on the extent to which revisions in bilateral and
multilateral agreements, including extradition and mutual assistance
treaties, would strengthen U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The review
should address the degree to which current categories of extraditable
offenses should be expanded to cover offenses, such as visa and
immigration fraud, which may be particularly useful against
terrorists and those who support them.
! The Intelligence Community, and particularly the FBI and the CIA,
should aggressively address the possibility that foreign governments
are providing  support to or are involved in terrorist activity targeting
the United States and U.S. interests. State-sponsored terrorism
substantially increases the likelihood of successful and more lethal
attacks within the United States. This issue must be addressed from
a national standpoint and should not be limited in focus by the
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geographical and factual boundaries of individual cases. The FBI
and CIA should aggressively and thoroughly pursue related matters
developed through this Joint Inquiry that have been referred to them
for further investigation by these Committees.
Key Hart-Rudman Commission Recommendations
! The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten
America’s ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attack
on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and
protection fail. 
Institutional Steps to Protect Against and Prepare
for Terrorist Attacks
Key 9/11 Commission Recommendations
! The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence,
operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists,
find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.
! The U. S. border security system should be integrated into a larger
network of screening points that includes our transportation system
and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors. The President
should direct the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] to lead
the effort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing
common problems and setting common standards with systemwide
goals in mind. Extending those standards among other governments
could dramatically strengthen America and the world’s collective
ability to intercept individuals who pose catastrophic threats.
! The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the
Congress, should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-
exit screening system, including a single system for speeding
qualified travelers. It should be integrated with the system that
provides benefits to foreigners seeking to stay in the United States.
Linking biometric passports to good data systems and decision
making is a fundamental goal.
! We should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted
allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel
and border crossing over the medium and long term through
extensive international cooperation.
! Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal
government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates
and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses. 
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! The U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation
assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for
defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of
doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement
the effort. The plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant
authorities (federal, state, regional, and local) and to private
stakeholders. 
! Improved use of “no-fly” and “automatic selectee” lists should not
be delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS
continues. This screening function should be performed by the TSA
[Transportation Security Administration], and it should utilize the
larger set of watch lists maintained by the federal government. Air
carriers should be required to supply the information needed to test
and implement this new system.
! The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving
the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on
passengers. As a start, each individual selected for special screening
should be screened for explosives. Further, the TSA should conduct
a human factors study, a method often used in the private sector, to
understand problems in screener performance and set attainable
objectives for individual screeners and for the checkpoints where
screening takes place.
! As the President determines the guidelines for information sharing
among government agencies and by those agencies with the private
sector, he should safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom
information is shared.
! The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power
should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually
materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate
supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection
of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate
guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.
! At this time of increased and consolidated government authority,
there should be a board within the executive branch to oversee
adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the
government makes to defend our civil liberties.
! Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an
assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. Now, in 2004, Washington,
D.C., and New York City are certainly at the top of any such list. We
understand the contention that every state and city needs to have
some minimum infrastructure for emergency response. But federal
homeland security assistance should not remain a program for
general revenue sharing. It should supplement state and local
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resources based on the risks or vulnerabilities that merit additional
support. 
! Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident
Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple
jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command.
Both are proven frameworks for emergency response. We strongly
support the decision that federal homeland security funding will be
contingent, as of October 1,2004, upon the adoption and regular use
of ICS and unified command procedures. In the future, the
Department of Homeland Security should consider making funding
contingent on aggressive and realistic training in accordance with
ICS and unified command procedures.
! Congress should support pending legislation which provides for the
expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public
safety purposes. Furthermore, high-risk urban areas such as New
York City and Washington, D.C., should establish signal corps units
to ensure communications connectivity between and among civilian
authorities, local first responders, and the National Guard. Federal
funding of such units should be given high priority by Congress.
! We endorse the American National Standards Institute’s [ANSI]
recommended standard for private preparedness. We were
encouraged by Secretary Tom Ridge’s praise of the standard, and
urge the Department of Homeland Security to promote its adoption.
We also encourage the insurance and credit-rating industries to look
closely at a company’s compliance with the ANSI standard in
assessing its insurability and creditworthiness. We believe that
compliance with the standard should define the standard of care
owed by a company to its employees and the public for legal
purposes.
! We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of
national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for
joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel
from the various agencies. The head of the NCTC should have
authority to evaluate the performance of the people assigned to the
Center.
Key Gilmore Commission Recommendations
! There should be a national level strategy on combating terrorism that
clearly delineates and distinguishes Federal, state, and local roles
and responsibilities and articulates clear direction for Federal
priorities and programs to support local responders; and a
comprehensive, parallel public education effort.
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! More needs to be done and can be done to obtain and share
information on potential terrorist threats at all levels of government,
to provide more effective deterrence, prevention, interdiction or
response, using modern information technology.  Efforts should be
accelerated to develop and to test agreed-on templates for command
and control under a wide variety of terrorist threat scenarios.
! Create a “National Office for Combating Terrorism” with the
Director appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate,
located in the Executive Office of the President. To have no
operational control, but specified control of Federal programs and
budgets. To have responsibility for strategy formulation and review
of plans. To have Assistants for Domestic Preparedness,
Intelligence, Health and Medical, RDT&E/National Standards, and
Management and Budget. To serve as the point of contact for the
Congress.
! Enhance Intelligence/Threat Assessments/Information Sharing
NOTE:  (the entity/person indicated  in parentheses is expected to take the
lead in carrying out the given recommendation).
— Improve human intelligence by rescinding CIA guidelines on
certain foreign informants (DCI).
— Improve measurement and signature intelligence through enhanced
RDT&E (Intelligence Community).
— Review/modify guidelines and procedures for domestic
investigations (Review Panel/Attorney General).
 — Review/modify authorities on certain CBRN [Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear] precursors and equipment
(Executive and Congress).
 — Improve forensics technology/analysis, and enhance indications
and warnings systems (National Office for Combating Terrorism—
hereafter National Office).
— Provide security clearances and more information to designated
State and local entities (National Office).
— Develop single-source, protected, web-based, integrated
information system (National Office).
— Develop a training program for State, local, and private sector for
interpreting intelligence products (DHS).
— Establish comprehensive procedures for sharing information with
relevant State and local officials (DHS).
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! Foster Better Planning/Coordination/Operations
— Designate Federal Response Plan as single-source “all hazards”
planning document (National Office).
— Develop “model” State plan (NEMA [National Emergency
Management Association] and FEMA [Federal Emergency
Management Agency]).
— Conduct inventories of State and local programs for nationwide
application (National Office).
— Promote/facilitate the adoption of multi-jurisdiction/multi-state
mutual aid compacts (National Office).
— Promote/facilitate adoption of standard ICS [Incident Command
System], UCS [Unified Command System], and EOC [Emergency
Operations Center] (National Office).
— Designate agency other than DoD as “Lead Federal Agency”
(President).
! Enhance Training, Equipping, and Exercising
— Develop input to strategy and plans in close coordination with
State and local entities (National Office).
— Restructure education and training opportunities to account for
volunteers in critical response disciplines.
— Develop realistic exercise scenarios that meet State and local
needs (National Office).
! Improve Health and Medical Capabilities
— Obtain strategy input/ program advice from public health/medical
care representatives (National Office).
— Promote certification programs for training and facilities (National
Office).
— Clarify authorities and procedures for health and medical response
(All jurisdictions).
— Improve surge capacity and stockpiles (All jurisdictions).
— Evaluate and test response capabilities (All public health and
medical entities).
— Establish standards for communications/mandatory reporting (All
public health/medical entities).
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— Establish laboratory standards and protocols (All public
health/medical entities).
! Promote Better Research and Development and Developing
National Standards
— Develop, with OSTP [Office of Science and Technology Policy],
equipment testing protocols and long-range research plan (National
Office).
— Establish national standards program with NIST [National Institute
of Standards and Technology] and NIOSH [National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health] as co-leads (National Office).
! Civil Liberties
— Establish a civil liberties oversight board to provide advice on any
statutory, regulatory, or procedural change that may have civil
liberties implications.
! State and Local Response Capabilities
— Increase and accelerate the sharing of terrorism-related
intelligence and threat assessments.
— Design training and equipment programs for all-hazards
preparedness.
— Redesign Federal training and equipment grant programs to
include sustainment components.
— Increase funding to States and localities for combating terrorism.
— Consolidate Federal grant program information and application
procedures.
— Design Federal preparedness programs to ensure first responder
participation, especially volunteers.
— Establish an information clearinghouse on Federal programs,
assets, and agencies.
— Configure Federal military response assets to support and reinforce
existing structures and systems.
— Combine all departmental grant making programs into a single
entity in DHS (DHS).
— Establish an interagency mechanism for homeland security grants
(President).
— Develop a comprehensive process for establishing training and
exercise standards for responders (DHS).
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— Revise the Homeland Security Advisory System to include (1) a
regional alert system (2) training to emergency responders about
preventive actions; and (3) specific guidance to potentially affected
regions (DHS).
— Establish sustained funding to enhance EMS [Emergency Medical
Services] response capacity for acts of terrorism (Congress). 
— Reestablish a Federal office specifically to support EMS
operational and systems issues (Congress).
— Establish a “Matrix” of Mutual Aid in coordination with local,
State, and other Federal agencies, for a nationwide system of mutually
supporting capabilities (DHS). 
— Adopt the Business Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate
Governance security component (DHS and private sector).
! Improving Health and Medical Capabilities 
— Implement the AMA [American Medical Association]
Recommendations on Medical Preparedness for Terrorism.
— Implement the JCAHO [Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations] Revised Emergency Standards.
— Fully resource the CDC [Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention] Biological and Chemical Terrorism Strategic Plan.
— Fully resource the CDC Laboratory Response Network for
Bioterrorism.
— Fully resource the CDC Secure and Rapid Communications
Networks.
— Develop standard medical response models for Federal, State, and
local levels.
— Reestablish a pre-hospital Emergency Medical Service Program
Office.
— Revise current EMT [Emergency Medical Technician] and PNST
[Paramedic National Standardized Training] training and refresher
curricula.
— Increase Federal resources for exercises for State and local health
and medical entities.
— Establish a government-owned, contractor-operated national
vaccine and therapeutics facility.
— Review and recommend changes to plans for vaccine stockpiles
and critical supplies.
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— Develop a comprehensive plan for research on terrorism-related
health and medical issues.
— Review MMRS [Metropolitan Medical Response System] and
NDMS [National Disaster Medical System] authorities, structures,
and capabilities.
— Develop an education plan on the legal and procedural issues for
health and medical response to terrorism.
— Develop on-going public education programs on terrorism causes
and effects.
— Strengthen the public health system with support on the order of
$1 billion per year for five years.
— Coordinate and centralize funding information from various
agencies and simplify the application process.
— Implement a formal process for evaluating the effectiveness of
investments in preparedness. 
— Fund studies on health care and public health workforce
requirements.
— Assess the resources required by the nation’s hospital system to
respond to terrorism.
— Strengthen the Health Alert Network and other secure and rapid
communications systems.
— Increase resources for public health and medical emergencies.
— Articulate and integrate the roles, missions, capabilities and
limitations of, and effectively train special response teams.
— Improve system for providing required technical assistance to
States and localities.
— Develop an electronic, continuously updated handbook on best
terrorism response practices.
— Strengthen and prioritize basic medical and applied public health
research.
— Adopt the Model Health Powers Emergency Act or develop and
adopt an alternative.
— Clarify the special conditions under which HIPAA [Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act] information can be
shared; and require State plans for enhanced cooperation between law
enforcement and public health, EMS and hospital officials.
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— Educate the public on health and medical information before,
during and after an event.
— Enhance research into the short and long-term psychological
consequences of terrorist attacks.
! Immigration and Border Control
— Create an intergovernmental border advisory group.
— Fully integrate all affected entities into local or regional “port
security committees.”
— Ensure that all border agencies are partners in intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination.
— Create, provide resources for, and mandate participation in a
“Border Security Awareness” database system.
— Require shippers to submit cargo manifest information
simultaneously with shipments transiting U.S. borders.
— Establish “Trusted Shipper” programs.
— Expand Coast Guard search authority to include U.S. owned— not
just “flagged”— vessels.
— Expand and consolidate research, development, and integration of
sensor, detection, and warning systems.
— Increase resources for the U.S. Coast Guard for homeland security
missions.
— Negotiate more comprehensive treaties and agreements for
combating terrorism with Canada and Mexico.
! Improving Cyber Security Against Terrorism
— Include private and State and local representatives on the
interagency critical infrastructure advisory panel.
— Create a commission to assess and make recommendations on
programs for cyber security.
— Establish a government funded, not-for-profit entity for cyber
detection, alert, and warning functions.
— Convene a “summit” to address Federal statutory changes that
would enhance cyber assurance.
— Create a special “Cyber Court” patterned after the court
established in FISA [Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act].
CRS-15
— Develop and implement a comprehensive plan for cyber security
research, development, test, and evaluation.
! Use of the Military in Homeland Security 
— Establish a homeland security Under Secretary position in the
Department of Defense.
— Establish a single unified command and control structure to
execute all military support to civil authorities.
— Develop detailed plans for the use of the military domestically
across the spectrum of potential activities.
— Expand training and exercises in relevant military units and with
Federal, State, and local responders.
— Direct new mission areas for the National Guard to provide
support to civil authorities.
— Publish a compendium of statutory authorities for using the
military domestically to combat terrorism.
— Improve the military full-time liaison elements in the ten Federal
Emergency Management Agency regions.
! Organizing the National Effort
— Produce continuing, comprehensive “strategic” assessments of
threats inside the United States.
— Ensure DHS authority to levy direct intelligence requirements, and
robust DHS capability for combining threat and vulnerability
information.
— Clearly define DHS and other Federal agency responsibilities
before, during, and after an attack.
— Designate DHS as lead, and DHHS [Department of Health and
Human Services] as principal supporting agency, for  bioterrorism
attack.
— Perform a comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate on the
threats to infrastructure.
— Restructure interagency mechanisms for better coordination.
— Thoroughly review applicable law and regulations; propose
legislative changes.
— Establish separate Congressional authorizing committee and
appropriation subcommittee for homeland security.
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— Establish a Federal Interagency Homeland Security Research and
Development Council (President).
— Improve capacity in the Intelligence Community for health and
medical analysis.
— Enhance technical assistance to states to develop plans and
procedures for distributing the NPS [National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile].
— Establish a national strategy for vaccine development.
— Implement the smallpox vaccination plan incrementally; and raise
the priority on research for a safer smallpox vaccine.
— Implement IOM [Institute of Medicine] Committee’s
recommendations on psychological preparedness (DHS and DHHS).
— Provide increased funding and DHS and DHHS monitor State and
local compliance of incorporating in plans an appropriate focus on
psychological and behavioral consequence preparedness and
management (Congress, DHS and DHHS).
— Create a Federal task force on psychological issues, jointly led by
DHHS and DHS (President).
! Defending Against Agricultural Terrorism
— Designate DHS as the lead and USDA [United States Department
of Agriculture] as the technical advisor on food safety and agriculture
and emergency preparedness (President).
— Include an Emergency Support Function for Agriculture and Food
in the Federal Response Plan and the National Incident Response
Plan.
— Allow specially designated laboratories to perform tests for foreign
agricultural diseases.
— Institute a standard system for fair compensation for agriculture
and food losses.
— Improve and provide incentives for veterinary medicine education
in foreign animal diseases; and improve education, training, and
exercises between government and the agricultural private sector.
Key Bremer Commission Recommendations
! Neither the Department of Justice [DoJ] nor the FBI has attempted
to clarify the FI [Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations] guidelines for international
terrorism investigations, and the Attorney General guidelines on
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General Crimes Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic
Security/Terrorism Investigations [which govern domestic
terrorism],  the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation should develop guidance to clarify the
application of both sets of guidelines. This guidance should specify
what facts and circumstances merit the opening of a preliminary
inquiry or full investigation and should direct agents in the field to
investigate terrorist activity vigorously, using the full extent of their
authority.
! During the period leading up to the millennium, the FISA [Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act] application process was streamlined.
Without lowering the FISA standards, applications were submitted
to the FISA Court by DoJ  promptly and with enough information to
establish probable cause. The Attorney General should direct that the
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review not require information in
excess of that actually mandated by the probable cause standard in
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act statute.
! To ensure timely review of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
applications, the Attorney General should substantially expand the
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review staff and direct it to
cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
! The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should establish
and equip a dedicated staff of reports officers to develop terrorism
and foreign intelligence information obtained at field offices and
headquarters for prompt dissemination to other agencies, especially
those within the intelligence community, while protecting privacy
and pending criminal cases.
! The Attorney General should clarify what information can be shared
and direct maximum dissemination of terrorist-related information
to policymakers and intelligence analysts consistent with the law.
! The President should direct the creation of a joint task force
consisting of all the agencies in the U.S. Government that possess
information or authority relevant to terrorist fundraising. The task
force should develop and implement a broad approach toward
disrupting the financial activities of terrorists. This approach should
use all available criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions,
including those for money laundering, tax and fraud violations, or
conspiracy charges.
! The Secretary of the Treasury should create a unit within the Office
of Foreign Assets Control dedicated to the issue of terrorist
fundraising.
CRS-18
! The President and Congress should work together to create an
effective system for monitoring the status of foreign students
nationwide.
! The Attorney General should direct the Department of Justice to
pursue vigorously the criminal prosecution of terrorists in an open
court whenever possible. 
! The Attorney General should further direct that where national
security requires the use of secret evidence in administrative
immigration cases, procedures for cleared counsel and unclassified
summaries, such as those provided in the Alien Terrorist Removal
Court (ATRC), should be used.
! The President should require the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget and the national counterterrorism
coordinator to agree on all budget guidance to the agencies,
including the response to initial budget submissions, and both
officials should be involved in presenting agencies’ counterterrorism
budget appeals to the President.
! The President should direct the preparation of a manual on the
implementation of existing legal authority necessary to address
effectively a catastrophic terrorist threat or attack. The manual
should be distributed to the appropriate federal, state, and local
officials and be used in training, exercises, and educational
programs.
! The President should determine whether any additional legal
authority is needed to deal with catastrophic terrorism and make
recommendations to Congress if necessary.
! The President should direct the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense and the Attorney General, to develop and adopt detailed
contingency plans that would transfer lead federal agency authority
to the Department of Defense if necessary during a catastrophic
terrorist attack or prior to an imminent attack.
! The Secretary of Defense should establish a unified command
structure that would integrate all catastrophic terrorism capabilities
and conduct detailed planning and exercises with relevant federal,
state, and local authorities.
! The President should direct (1) the Exercise Subgroup, under the
direction of the national coordinator for counterterrorism, to exercise
annually the government’s response to a catastrophic terrorism
crisis, including consequence management; and (2) all relevant
federal agencies to plan, budget and participate in counterterrorism
and consequence management exercises coordinated by the Exercise
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Subgroup and ensure senior officer level participation, particularly
in the annual exercises.
! The President should establish a comprehensive and coordinated
long-term Research and Development program to counter
catastrophic terrorism.
! The Secretary of Health and Human Services should strengthen
physical security standards applicable to the storage, creation, and
transport of pathogens in research laboratories and other certified
facilities in order to protect against theft or diversion. These
standards should be as rigorous as the physical protection and
security measures applicable to critical nuclear materials. 
! The Secretary of Health and Human Services, working with the
Department of State, should develop an international monitoring
program to provide early warning of infectious disease outbreaks
and possible terrorist experimentation with biological substances.
Key Recommendations of the Joint Inquiry of House and
Senate Intelligence Committees
! Enhance the depth and quality of domestic intelligence collection
and analysis by, for example, modernizing current intelligence
reporting formats through the use of existing information technology
to emphasize the existence and the significance of links between
new and previously acquired information.
! Congress and the Administration should ensure the full development
within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-
source terrorism information fusion center that will dramatically
improve the focus and quality of counterterrorism analysis and
facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence
information, both within and beyond the boundaries of the
Intelligence Community. Congress and the Administration should
ensure that this fusion center has all the authority and the resources
needed to:
— have full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related
intelligence information, including “raw” supporting data as needed;
— have the ability to participate fully in the existing requirements
process for tasking the Intelligence Community to gather information
on foreign individuals, entities and threats;
— integrate such information in order to identify and assess the
nature and scope of terrorist threats to the United States in light of
actual and potential vulnerabilities;
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— implement and fully utilize data mining and other advanced
analytical tools, consistent with applicable law;
— retain a permanent staff of experienced and highly skilled analysts,
supplemented on a regular basis by personnel on “joint tours” from
the various Intelligence Community agencies;
— institute a reporting mechanism that enables analysts at all the
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to post lead information
for use by analysts at other agencies without waiting for
dissemination of a formal report;
— maintain excellence and creativity in staff analytic skills through
regular use of analysis and language training programs; and
— establish and sustain effective channels for the exchange of
counterterrorism related information with federal agencies outside the
Intelligence Community as well as with state and local authorities.
! Given the FBI’s history of repeated shortcomings within its current
responsibility for domestic intelligence, and in the face of grave and
immediate threats to our homeland, the FBI should strengthen and
improve its domestic capability as fully and expeditiously as
possible by immediately instituting measures to:
— strengthen counterterrorism as a national FBI program by clearly
designating national counterterrorism priorities and enforcing field
office adherence to those priorities;
— establish and sustain independent career tracks within the FBI that
recognize and provide incentives for demonstrated skills and
performance of counterterrorism agents and analysts;
— significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities by assuring
the qualification, training, and independence of analysts, coupled with
sufficient access to necessary information and resources;
— establish a strong reports officer cadre at FBI Headquarters and
field offices to facilitate timely dissemination of intelligence from
agents to analysts within the FBI and other agencies within the
Intelligence Community;
— implement training for agents in the effective use of analysts and
analysis in their work;
— expand and sustain the recruitment of agents and analysts with the
linguistic skills needed in counterterrorism efforts;
— increase substantially efforts to penetrate terrorist organizations
operating in the United States through all available means of
collection;
— improve the national security law training of FBI personnel;
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— implement mechanisms to maximize the exchange of
counterterrorism-related information between the FBI and other
federal, state and local agencies; and
— finally solve the FBI’s persistent and incapacitating information
technology problems.
! The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI should take action
necessary to ensure that:
— the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and other Department
of Justice components provide in-depth training to the FBI and other
members of the Intelligence Community regarding the use of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to address terrorist
threats to the United States;
— the FBI disseminates results of searches and surveillances
authorized under FISA to appropriate personnel within the FBI and
the Intelligence Community on a timely basis so they may be used for
analysis and operations that address terrorist threats to the United
States; and
— the FBI develops and implements a plan to use authorities
provided by FISA  to assess the threat of international terrorist groups
within the United States fully, including the extent to which such
groups are funded or otherwise supported by foreign governments.
! The President should review and consider amendments to the
Executive Orders, policies and procedures that govern the national
security classification of intelligence information, in an effort to
expand access to relevant information for federal agencies outside
the Intelligence Community, for state and local authorities, which
are critical to the fight against terrorism, and for the American
public. In addition, the President and the heads of federal agencies
should ensure that the policies and procedures to protect against the
unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence information are
well understood, fully implemented and vigorously enforced.
! Congress and the Administration should ensure the full development
of a national watchlist center that will be responsible for
coordinating and integrating all terrorist related watchlist systems;
promoting awareness and use of the center by all relevant
government agencies and elements of the private sector; and
ensuring a consistent and comprehensive flow of terrorist names into
the center from all relevant points of collection.
Key Hart-Rudman Commission Recommendations
! The President should propose, and Congress should agree to create,
a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility
for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government
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activities involved in homeland security. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) should be a key building block in this
effort. 
! The President should propose to Congress the transfer of the
Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to the National
Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct
entities. 
! The President should propose to Congress the establishment of an
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the
Secretary. 
! The Secretary of Defense, at the President’s direction, should make
homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and the
Guard should be organized, properly trained, and adequately
equipped to undertake that mission.
! The National Security Council (NSC) should be responsible for
advising the President and for coordinating the multiplicity of
national security activities, broadly defined to include economic and
domestic law enforcement activities as well as the traditional
national security agenda. The NSC Advisor and staff should resist
the temptation to assume a central policymaking and operational
role. 
! The President should create an implementing mechanism to ensure
that the major recommendations of this Commission result in the
critical reforms necessary to ensure American national security and
global leadership over the next quarter century. 
Intelligence Issues
Key 9/11 Commission Recommendations
! The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be
replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of
responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific
subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage
the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that
contribute to it.
! The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA’s
analytic capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by
building its human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing a
stronger language program, with high standards and sufficient
financial incentives; (d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity
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among operations officers so they can blend more easily in foreign
cities; (e) ensuring a seamless relationship between human source
collection and signals collection at the operational level; and (f)
stressing a better balance between unilateral and liaison operations.
! Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary
operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the
Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the
capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations
already being developed in the Special Operations Command.
! The overall amounts of money being appropriated for national
intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept
secret. Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for
intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these tens of
billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of
intelligence work.
! Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to
restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge.
! The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring the
major national security institutions into the information revolution.
He should coordinate the resolution of the legal, policy, and
technical issues across agencies to create a “trusted information
network.”
! A specialized and integrated national security workforce should be
established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and
surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and
retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued
with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.
Key Gilmore Commission Recommendations
! Establish a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC).
! Transfer the collection of terrorism related intelligence inside the
United States to the NCTC.
!  Establish the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as an independent
agency and require TTIC to have permanent staff from
representative State and local entities (Congress).
 ! Produce continuing, comprehensive “strategic” assessments of
threats inside the United States.
 ! Develop and disseminate continuing comprehensive strategic threat
assessments (Intelligence Community and DHS).
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! Ensure DHS authority to levy direct intelligence requirements, and
robust DHS capability for combining threat and vulnerability
information.
! Perform a comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate on the
threats to infrastructure.
 ! Perform a National Intelligence Estimate on the threat to agriculture
and food. 
Key Bremer Commission Recommendations
! The Director of Central Intelligence should make it clear to the
Central Intelligence Agency that the aggressive recruitment of
human intelligence sources on terrorism is one of the intelligence
community’s highest priorities.
! The Director of Central Intelligence should issue a directive that the
1995 guidelines will no longer apply to recruiting terrorist
informants. That directive should notify officers in the field that the
pre-existing process of assessing such informants will apply.
! The President should direct the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to work with Congress to ensure that adequate
resources are devoted to meet essential technology requirements of
the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and to expand and accelerate the DCI’s
Counterterrorist Center’s activities.
! The Director of Central Intelligence should authorize the Foreign
Language Executive Committee to develop a larger pool of linguists
and an interagency strategy for employing them, including flexible
approaches to reduce problems related to handling of classified
material.
Key Recommendations of the Joint Inquiry of House and
Senate Intelligence Committees
! The National Security Act of 1947 should be amended to create and
sufficiently staff a statutory Director of National Intelligence who
shall be the President’s principal advisor on intelligence and shall
have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel
responsibilities needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence
Community operate as a coherent whole. These responsibilities
should include:
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— establishment and enforcement of consistent priorities for the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence throughout the
Intelligence Community; 
— setting of policy and the ability to move personnel between
elements of the Intelligence Community;
— review, approval, modification, and primary management and
oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community budgets;
— review, approval, modification, and primary management and
oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community personnel and
resource allocations;
— review, approval, modification, and primary management and
oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community research and
development efforts;
— review, approval, and coordination of relationships between the
Intelligence Community agencies and foreign intelligence and law
enforcement services; and 
— exercise of statutory authority to insure that Intelligence
Community agencies and components fully comply with Community-
wide policy, management, spending, and administrative guidance and
priorities.
! The Director of National Intelligence should be a Cabinet level
position, appointed by the President and subject to Senate
confirmation. Congress and the President should also work to insure
that the Director of National Intelligence effectively exercises these
authorities.
! To insure focused and consistent Intelligence Community
leadership, Congress should require that no person may
simultaneously serve as both the Director of National Intelligence
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or as the
director of any other specific intelligence agency.
! Current efforts by the National Security Council to examine and
revamp existing intelligence priorities should be expedited, given the
immediate need for clear guidance in intelligence and
counterterrorism efforts. The President should take action to ensure
that clear, consistent, and current priorities are established and
enforced throughout the Intelligence Community. Once established,
these priorities should be reviewed and updated on at least an annual
basis to ensure that the allocation of Intelligence Community
resources reflects and effectively addresses the continually evolving
threat environment.
! The position of National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should
be created on the National Intelligence Council and a highly
CRS-26
qualified individual appointed to prepare intelligence estimates on
terrorism for the use of Congress and policymakers in the Executive
Branch and to assist the Intelligence Community in developing a
program for strategic analysis and assessments.
!  Recognizing that the Intelligence Community’s employees remain
its greatest resource, the Director of National Intelligence should
require that measures be implemented to greatly enhance the
recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence
skills and expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts,
including:
— the agencies of the Intelligence Community should act promptly
to expand and improve counterterrorism training programs within the
Community, insuring coverage of such critical areas as information
sharing among law enforcement and intelligence personnel; language
capabilities; the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; and
watchlisting;
— the Intelligence Community should build on the provisions of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 regarding the
development of language capabilities, including the Act’s requirement
for a report on the feasibility of establishing a Civilian Linguist
Reserve Corps, and implement expeditiously measures to identify and
recruit linguists outside the Community whose abilities are relevant
to the needs of counterterrorism;
— the existing Intelligence Community Reserve Corps should be
expanded to ensure the use of relevant personnel and expertise from
outside the Community as special needs arise;
! The Director of National Intelligence should require more extensive
use of “joint tours” for intelligence and appropriate law enforcement
personnel to broaden their experience and help bridge existing
organizational and cultural divides through service in other agencies.
These joint tours should include not only service at Intelligence
Community agencies, but also service in those agencies that are
users or consumers of intelligence products. Serious incentives for
joint service should be established throughout the Intelligence
Community and personnel should be rewarded for joint service with
career advancement credit at individual agencies. The Director of
National Intelligence should also require Intelligence Community
agencies to participate in joint exercises.
! The Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a more
ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to
capitalize upon the unique cultural and linguistic capabilities of first-
generation Americans, a strategy designed to utilize their skills to the
greatest practical effect while recognizing the potential
counterintelligence challenges such hiring decisions might pose.
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! Steps should be taken to increase and ensure the greatest return on
this nation’s substantial investment in intelligence, including:
— the President should submit budget recommendations, and
Congress should enact budget authority, for sustained, long-term
investment in counterterrorism capabilities that avoid dependence on
repeated stop-gap supplemental appropriations;
— in making such budget recommendations, the President should
provide for the consideration of a separate classified Intelligence
Community budget;
— long-term counterterrorism investment should be accompanied by
sufficient flexibility, subject to congressional oversight, to enable the
Intelligence Community to rapidly respond to altered or unanticipated
needs;
— the Director of National Intelligence should insure that Intelligence
Community budgeting practices and procedures are revised to better
identify the levels and nature of counterterrorism funding within the
Community;
— counterterrorism funding should be allocated in accordance with
the program requirements of the national counterterrorism strategy;
and
— due consideration should be given to directing an outside agency
or entity to conduct a thorough and rigorous cost-benefit analysis of
the resources spent on intelligence.
! Assured standards of accountability are critical to developing the
personal responsibility, urgency, and diligence which our
counterterrorism responsibility requires. Given the absence of any
substantial efforts within the Intelligence Community to impose
accountability in relation to the events of September 11, 2001, the
Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of Intelligence
Community agencies should require that measures designed to
ensure accountability are implemented throughout the Community.
To underscore the need for accountability:
— The Director of Central Intelligence should report to the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees no later than June 30, 2003 as to
the steps taken to implement a system of accountability throughout
the Intelligence Community, to include processes for identifying poor
performance and affixing responsibility for it, and for recognizing and
rewarding excellence in performance; 
! As part of the confirmation process for Intelligence Community
officials, Congress should require from those officials an affirmative
commitment to the implementation and use of strong accountability
mechanisms throughout the Intelligence Community;
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! The Inspectors General at the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the
Department of State should review the factual findings and the
record of this Inquiry and conduct investigations and reviews as
necessary to determine whether and to what extent personnel at all
levels should be held accountable for any omission, commission, or
failure to meet professional standards in regard to the identification,
prevention, or disruption of terrorist attacks, including the events of
September 11, 2001. These reviews should also address those
individuals who performed in a stellar or exceptional manner, and
the degree to which the quality of their performance was rewarded
or otherwise impacted their careers.  Based on those investigations
and reviews, agency heads should take appropriate disciplinary and
other action and the President and the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees should be advised of such action.
! The Administration should review and report to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees by June 30, 2003 regarding what
progress has been made in reducing the inappropriate and obsolete
barriers among intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged
in counterterrorism, what remains to be done to reduce those
barriers, and what legislative actions may be advisable in that regard.
In particular, this report should address what steps are being taken
to insure that perceptions within the Intelligence Community about
the scope and limits of current law and policy with respect to
restrictions on collection and information sharing are, in fact,
accurate and well-founded.
Key Hart-Rudman Commission Recommendations
! The President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council:
include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an area of
analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and
produce National Intelligence Estimates on these threats. 
! The President should order the setting of national intelligence
priorities through National Security Council guidance to the Director
of Central Intelligence.
! The Director of Central Intelligence should emphasize the
recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of the
intelligence community’s highest priorities, and ensure that
operational guidelines are balanced between security needs and
respect for American values and principles.
!  The intelligence community should place new emphasis on
collection and analysis of economic and science/technology security
concerns, and incorporate more open source intelligence into
analytical products. Congress should support this new emphasis by
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increasing significantly the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) budget for collection and analysis. 
Congress and Oversight Issues
Key 9/11 Commission Recommendations
! Congressional oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is now
dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have
considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single
committee in each house of Congress, combining authorizing and
appropriating authorities, is another.
! Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and
review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to
judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department
and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the obligation
to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this
committee should be a permanent standing committee with a
nonpartisan staff.
! Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice, we
should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national
security policymaking during the change of administrations by
accelerating the process for national security appointments. We think
the process could be improved significantly so transitions can work
more effectively and allow new officials to assume their new
responsibilities as quickly as possible.  The Department of Defense
and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of
Northern Command’s strategies and planning to defend the United
States against military threats to the homeland.  The Department of
Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly
assess the types of threats the country faces to determine (a) the
adequacy of the government’s plans— and the progress against those
plans— to protect America’s critical infrastructure and (b) the
readiness of the government to respond to the threats that the United
States might face.
Key Gilmore Commission Recommendations
! Concentrate oversight of the NCTC [National Counter Terrorism
Center] in the intelligence committee in each House.
! Establish separate Congressional authorizing committee and
appropriation subcommittee for homeland security.
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Key Bremer Commission Recommendations
! Congress should promptly ratify the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and pass any legislation
necessary for full implementation.
 
! Congress should enact legislation to make countries designated as
“Not Cooperating Fully” ineligible for the Visa Waiver Program.
! Congress should review the status of the Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTO) statute within five years to determine whether
changes are appropriate.
! Congress should develop a mechanism for reviewing the President’s
counterterrorism policy and budget as a whole. The executive branch
should commit to full consultation with Congress on
counterterrorism issues.
! House and Senate Appropriations Committees should immediately
direct full-committee staff to conduct a cross-subcommittee review
of counterterrorism budgets.
! The Congress should:
— Make possession of designated critical pathogens illegal for
anyone who is not properly certified.
— Control domestic sale and transfer of equipment critical to the
development or use of biological agents by certifying legitimate users
of critical equipment and prohibiting sales of such equipment to non-
certified entities.
— Require tagging of critical equipment to enable law enforcement
to identify its location.
— By recent statute, federal agencies must reimburse up to one half
of the cost of personal liability insurance to law enforcement officers
and managers or supervisors. Congress should amend the statute to
mandate full reimbursement of the costs of personal liability
insurance for Federal Bureau of Investigation special agents and
Central Intelligence Agency officers in the field who are combating
terrorism.
Key Recommendations of the Joint Inquiry of House and
Senate Intelligence Committees
! The establishment of Intelligence Community priorities, and the
justification for such priorities, should be reported to both the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees on an annual basis.
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! The Intelligence Community should fully inform the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees of significant developments in these
efforts, through regular reports and additional communications as
necessary, and the Committees should, in turn, exercise vigorous and
continuing oversight of the Community’s work in this critically
important area.
! Congress and the Administration should carefully consider how best
to structure and manage U.S. domestic intelligence responsibilities.
Congress should review the scope of domestic intelligence
authorities to determine their adequacy in pursuing counterterrorism
at home and ensuring the protection of privacy and other rights
guaranteed under the Constitution. This review should include, for
example, such questions as whether the range of persons subject to
searches and surveillances authorized under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) should be expanded.
! Based on their oversight responsibilities, the Intelligence and
Judiciary Committees of the Congress, as appropriate, should
consider promptly, in consultation with the Administration, whether
the FBI should continue to perform the domestic intelligence
functions of the United States Government or whether legislation is
necessary to remedy this problem, including the possibility of
creating a new agency to perform those functions.
! Congress should require that the new Director of National
Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security report to the President and the
Congress on a date certain concerning:
— the FBI’s progress since September 11, 2001 in implementing the
reforms required to conduct an effective domestic intelligence
program, including the measures recommended above;
— the experience of other democratic nations in organizing the
conduct of domestic intelligence;
— the specific manner in which a new domestic intelligence service
could be established in the United States, recognizing the need to
enhance national security while fully protecting civil liberties; and
— their recommendations on how to best fulfill the nation’s need for
an effective domestic intelligence capability, including necessary
legislation.
! The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees should
continue to examine the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and
its implementation thoroughly, particularly with respect to changes
made as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act and the subsequent
decision of the United States Foreign Intelligence Court of Review,
to determine whether its provisions adequately address present and
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emerging terrorist threats to the United States. Legislation should be
proposed by those Committees to remedy any deficiencies identified
as a result of that review.
! The Director of the National Security Agency should present to the
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense by
June 30, 2003, and report to the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees, a detailed plan that:
— describes solutions for the technological challenges for signals
intelligence;
— requires a review, on a quarterly basis, of the goals, products to be
delivered, funding levels and schedules for every technology
development program;
— ensures strict accounting for program expenditures;
— within their jurisdiction as established by current law, makes NSA
a full collaborating partner with the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the war on terrorism, including
fully integrating the collection and analytic capabilities of NSA, CIA,
and the FBI; and makes recommendations for legislation needed to
facilitate these goals.
! In evaluating the plan, the Committees should also consider issues
pertaining to whether civilians should be appointed to the position
of Director of the National Security Agency and whether the term of
service for the position should be longer than it has been in the
recent past.
! Congress should consider enacting legislation, modeled on the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill the concept of “jointness”
throughout the Intelligence Community. By emphasizing such things
as joint education, a joint career specialty, increased authority for
regional commanders, and joint exercises, that act greatly enhanced
the joint warfighting capabilities of the individual military services.
Legislation to instill similar concepts throughout the Intelligence
Community could help improve management of Community
resources and priorities and insure a far more effective “team” effort
by all the intelligence agencies. 
! Congress should expand and improve existing educational grant
programs focused on intelligence-related fields, similar to military
scholarship programs and others that provide financial assistance in
return for a commitment to serve in the Intelligence Community.
 
! Recognizing the importance of intelligence in this nation’s struggle
against terrorism, Congress should maintain vigorous, informed, and
constructive oversight of the Intelligence Community. To best
achieve that goal, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
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Upon the United States should study and make recommendations
concerning how Congress may improve its oversight of the
Intelligence Community, including consideration of such areas as:
— changes in the budgetary process;
— changes in the rules regarding membership on the oversight
committees;
— whether oversight responsibility should be vested in a joint House-
Senate Committee or, as currently exists, in separate Committees in
each house;
— the extent to which classification decisions impair congressional
oversight; and  how Congressional oversight can best contribute to the
continuing need of the Intelligence Community to evolve and adapt
to changes in the subject matter of intelligence and the needs of
policy makers.
! Congress should also review the statutes, policies and procedures
that govern the national security classification of intelligence
information and its protection from unauthorized disclosure. Among
other matters, Congress should consider the degree to which
excessive classification has been used in the past and the extent to
which the emerging threat environment has greatly increased the
need for real-time sharing of sensitive information.
! The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, should review and
report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on
proposals for a new and more realistic approach to the processes and
structures that have governed the designation of sensitive and
classified information. The report should include proposals to
protect against the use of the classification process as a shield to
protect agency self-interest.
! The Director of Central Intelligence should report to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees no later than June 30, 2003 as to the
steps taken to implement a system of accountability throughout the
Intelligence Community, to include processes for identifying poor
performance and affixing responsibility for it, and for recognizing
and rewarding excellence in performance.
! As part of the confirmation process for Intelligence Community
officials, Congress should require from those officials an affirmative
commitment to the implementation and use of strong accountability
mechanisms throughout the Intelligence Community.
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Key Hart-Rudman Commission Recommendations
! Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland
security issues, as has been done with intelligence oversight.
Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy,
defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations. This
body should also include members of all relevant Congressional
committees as well as ex-officio members from the leadership of
both Houses of Congress. 
! Congress should rationalize its current committee structure so that
it best serves U.S. national security objectives; specifically, it should
merge the current authorizing committees with the relevant
appropriations subcommittees. 
! The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus on foreign
policy and national security consultation with Congress and devote
resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation a
higher priority and form a permanent consultative group of
Congressional leaders as part of this effort. 
!  The Congressional leadership should conduct a thorough bicameral,
bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch relationship to national
security and foreign policy. 
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Appendix: Origins and Mandates of Commissions
Reviewed in this Report
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (9/11 Commission)
Its website is [http://www.9-11commission.gov/].
Popularly referred to as the “9/11 Commission” it was established by Title VI
of P.L. 107-306, 107th Congress, 2nd session (November 27, 2002).  It released its
report on July 22, 2004.  This Commission was charged with:
— examining and reporting on the facts and causes relating to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States;
— evaluating and reporting on the evidence developed by all relevant
governmental agencies regarding the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attacks; 
— to build upon the investigations of other entities, and avoid
unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Joint Inquiry of the Select Intelligence
Committees of the House and Senate, and other executive branch,
congressional or independent commission investigations into the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, other terrorist attacks, and
terrorism generally; 
— to make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances
surrounding the attacks, and the extent of the United States’
preparedness for, and the immediate response to, the attacks; and
— to investigate and report to the President and Congress on its
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures
that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.
The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Gilmore Commission)
Its reports can be found at this website: [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/].
Popularly known as the Gilmore Commission it was created pursuant to section
1405 of P.L. 105-241 105th Congress, 2nd session (October 17, 1998), and whose
authorities were extended for two additional years by section 1514 of P.L. 107-107,
107th Congress, 1st session (December 28, 2001). Produced an annual report each year
from 1999-2003 in December of every year.  Its final report was released December
15, 2003.  This Commission was charged with:
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 — assessing Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness
for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
— assessing the progress of Federal training programs for local
emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction;
— assessing deficiencies in programs for response to incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of
unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements,
and the needs of maritime regions;
— recommending strategies for ensuring effective coordination with
respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response
efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for
weapons of mass destruction incidents; and
— assessing the appropriate roles of State and local governments in
funding effective local response capabilities.
Each of the annual reports of the Commission, submitted to the President and to
Congress, was to set forth the Commission’s findings, conclusions and
recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency
preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
The National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer
Commission)
Its report is at this website: [http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/].
Popularly known at the Bremer Commission it was created pursuant to section
591 of P.L. 105-277, 105th Congress, 2nd Session (October 21, 1998). Its final report
was released on June 5, 2000.  This Commission was charged with:
— reviewing the laws, regulations, policies, directives, and practices
relating to counter-terrorism in the prevention and punishment of
international terrorism directed towards the United States;
— assessing the extent to which, laws, regulations, policies,
directives, and practices relating to counter-terrorism have been
effective in preventing or punishing international terrorism directed
towards the United States.  This assessment was to include a review
of:
(1) Evidence that terrorist organizations have established an infrastructure in the
western hemisphere for the support and conduct of terrorist activities;
(2) Executive branch efforts to coordinate counterterrorism activities among
Federal, State, and local agencies and with other nations to determine the
effectiveness of such coordination efforts;
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(3) Executive branch efforts to prevent the use of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons by terrorists.
The Commission was to recommend changes to counterterrorism policy in
preventing and punishing international terrorism directed toward the United States
not later than six months after the date the Commission first met, providing a final
report to the President and the Congress.
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
(Hart-Rudman Commission)
The final report is found at this website: [http://www.crs.gov/staff/911/pdf/
rmap_ns1.pdf].
Popularly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission it was authorized by
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen on September 2, 1999.  It produced and
submitted three separate  reports. The first: New World Coming: American Security
in the 21st Century on September 15, 1999; the second: Seeking A National Strategy:
A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom on April 15, 2000; the
third: Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change was submitted on
March 15, 2001. This Commission was charged with:
— conducting a comprehensive review of the early 21st Century
global security environment;
— developing a comprehensive overview of American strategic
interests and objectives for the security environment likely to be
encountered in the 21st Century;
— delineating a national security strategy appropriate to that
environment and the nation’s character;
— identifying a range of alternatives to implement the national
security strategy, by defining the security goals for American society,
and by describing the internal and external policy instruments
required to apply American resources in the 21st Century;
— developing a detailed plan to implement the range of alternatives
by describing the sequence of measures necessary to attain the
national security strategy, to include recommending concomitant
changes to the national security apparatus as necessary.
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The Joint Inquiry of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence
The report can be found at the following  website, which includes the report and
the recommendations and findings which are printed separately as an errata
compilation as noted on the homepage:
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html].
The two Congressional Committees responsible for oversight of the U.S.
intelligence community agreed in February 2002 during the 2nd session of the 107th
Congress to conduct a “Joint Inquiry” into a range of issues related to the terrorist
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 with the focus on the activities
of the U.S. Intelligence Community.  The committees  issued a final report on
December 15, 2002, entitled “Intelligence Community Activities Before and After
the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,” H.Rept. 107-792 and S.Rept. 107-351,
printed jointly, 107th Congress, 2nd session. The goals of  the Joint Inquiry were to:
—  conduct a factual review of what the Intelligence Community
knew or should have known prior to September 11, 2001, regarding
the international terrorist threat to the United States, include the scope
and nature of any possible international terrorist attacks against the
United States and its interests;
— identify and examine any systemic problems that may have
impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of or preventing
these attacks in advance; and
— make recommendations to improve the Intelligence Community’s
ability to identify and prevent future international terrorist attacks.
